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Abstract 
Safety analysis frequently relies on human estimates of the likelihood of specific 
events. For this purpose, the opinions of experts are given greater weight than 
the opinions of non-experts. Combinations of individual judgements are given 
greater weight than judgements made by a lone expert. Various authors advocate 
specific techniques for eliciting and combining these judgements. All of these 
factors Ȃ the use of experts, the use of multiple opinions, and the use of 
elicitation and combination techniques Ȃ serve to increase subjective confidence 
in the safety analysis. But is this confidence justified? Do the factors increase the 
actual validity of the analysis in proportion to the increase in subjective 
confidence?  
 
In this paper, by means of a critical synthesis of evidence from multiple 
disciplines, we argue that it is plausible that expert judgement deserves special 
standing, but only for well understood local causal mechanisms. We also 
conclude that expert judgements can be improved by using appropriate 
elicitation techniques, including by combining judgement from multiple experts. 
There is, however, no evidence to suggest that fuzzy algorithms, neural 
networks, or any other form of complicated processing of expert judgement have 
any advantage over simple combination mechanisms.  
1 Why does expert judgement validity matter? 
 
Would you trust a panel of government risk experts who told you that it was safe 
to build a nuclear waste processing plant in your neighbourhood? How about an 
international community of scientists predicting climate change? How about a 
single engineer telling you not to cross a bridge, because their calculations 
suggested it was unsafe?  
 
Safety analysis has always, to a greater or lesser extent, relied on the opinions of 
experts.  Individuals with specialist domain knowledge, or with superior 
understanding of risk analysis, are called upon to determine the nature, size, and 
acceptability of risk. Risk estimates produced by experts are more believable, but 
this does not necessarily make them more correct.  
 Our discussion in this paper is concerned with the use of experts for estimating 
the risk of major accident events. Unlike some risk problems such as population 
health, where there is a substantial body of recent data on which to base 
projections, major accidents occur too infrequently for past statistics to be a 
good indicator of risk.  
 
It is in these situations that expert judgement is most necessary, but also most 
questionable. A clear understanding of the validity of expert judgements, and of 
how their validity is influenced by methods of elicitation and combination is 
essential for good safety practice. It is also important to be able to draw a clear 
distinction between expert estimates and value judgements. Experts should 
demand a role in decision-making only to the extent that they have something 
offer, not because their status confers special privileges.  
 
There is an increasing trend to make use of multiple expert opinions in safety 
analysis, and to formalise the way these estimates are used. This involves 
documented methods for how opinions are elicited, how they are combined, and 
how they are integrated with other facets of the analysis. The trend is manifest in 
the academic literature - for recent illustrative examples see Zhou (2017), 
Forteza (2016),  and Kokangul (2017) Ȃ and in regulatory guidance (Boring et al., 
2005). 
 
Practices for forecasting using expert judgement have been heavily studied 
outside safety science. In particular, there has been extensive work within social 
psychology and management focussing on group decision-making, and within 
economics focussing on the mathematics of combining individual probability 
estimates. There is also a body of large-scale experimental work using prediction 
markets and competitive forecasting. A lot is known about expert forecasting, 
but little of this knowledge is employed in safety practice.  
 
In writing this paper we have been motivated by the proliferation of complicated 
techniques in the academic safety literature for eliciting and combining expert 
judgments. Of particular concern are papers that make definitive claims about 
the size and nature of risk based on these methods. Such research takes an 
unequivocally realist position on the nature of risk, whilst making unwarranted 
assumptions about the validity of the methods used. For example: 
x That the performance of a safety management system has improved 
x That human factors make a greater contribution to coal mining accidents 
than other safety issues 
x That there is a particular ordered ranking of risks for cargo ships 
x That particular geographic locations are more dangerous than other 
locations 
x That specific companies are safer than other companies1 
 
Frankly, we would like this researcher behaviour to stop. Armstrong suggests 
that the Golden Rule of forecasting is ǲbe conservative by adhering to cumulative 
knowledge about the situation and about forecasting methodsǳ(Armstrong, Green, 
& Graefe, 2015). In other words, forecasts should take into account what is 
known about forecasting itself, not just what is known about the problem at 
hand.  
 
There are two questions that must be answered before expert opinion can be 
used to make definitive claims about safety risk: 
 
1. What can be currently claimed about the validity of expert estimates as data 
for the purpose of safety risk estimation? 
 
2. Under what circumstances, and to what extent, do methods for elicitation and 
combination of expert estimates of safety risk improve their validity?  
2 /ƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƵĐŚĂƚŚŝŶŐĂƐĂ ?ƌŝƐk estimation ĞǆƉĞƌƚ ? ? 
2.1  ?ǆƉĞƌƚ ?ŝƐĂǀĞƌǇĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐƚĞƌŵĨŽƌƌŝƐŬĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ and analysis 
 
Predicting the future is a fundamental element of carnival fortune telling, sports 
betting, religious prophecy, and financial planning. Some types of prediction can 
be trusted, and others are cannot. Some people are better at making predictions. ǲǳǫ 
 
There are two main definitions of experts for the purpose of forecasting. 
 
1. An expert is someone whose judgement is accorded extra weight, due to 
their qualifications, experience, and other signals of authority 
(Farrington-Darby & Wilson, 2006). 
 
2. An expert is someone who makes especially accurate forecasts (Mellers et 
al., 2015).  
 
Each of these descriptions is, in its own way, a fair summary. Which definition 
applies for risk assessment and analysis depends on how exactly risk is 
understood.  
 
                                                        
1 It is not our intention to name and shame individual authors, so we have listed here 
unreferenced examples of recent definitive claims about risk based on processing of expert 
judgement. 
 
The realist view (Smith, 2004) maintains that risk is a real, objective and 
quantifiable truth. The likelihood of an event in the future becomes the 
frequency of that event with the benefit of hindsight. Whilst we cannot know for 
certain how accurate risk estimates are at the time they are made, their accuracy 
may (at least in principle) be knowable at some point in the future.  
 
In contrast, the phenomenological tradition, as explained by Rosa (1998), holds 
that even if objective risk exists as an abstract idea, there is no way to separate 
objective risk from our subjective and constructed experience of risk.   
 
Very few researchers or practitioners argue that risk is entirely objective or 
entirely constructive Ȃ strict realism and strict phenomenology are extremes on 
a theoretical continuum. However, an inclination towards one paradigm or the ǡǲǳǤ 
Most practical risk assessment is conducted from a generally realist perspective, 
whilst acknowledging that some degree of uncertainty is inevitable. Estimating 
risk, under this perspective, is analogous to guessing the number of marbles in a 
jar. The estimate is subjective, and the true number may never be known, but it 
is still possible to make statements about the objective goodness of the estimate. 
Goodness encompasses accuracy, certainty, and calibration. 
 ǲǳmber.  For example, if 
there are 250 marbles, an estimate of 240 is more accurate than an estimate of 
230.  
 ǲertainǳǤ	ǡǲ ? ? ?ǡarbles  ? ? ? ? ? ?ǳǤ
statements of this type were correct less than 90% of the time, and under-
confident if they were correct more than 90% of the time.  
 
There is no accepted term for correctness of certaintyǤǲǳ; 
an estimate is calibrated if it is neither under confident nor over confident. It is 
better for an estimate to be more certain rather than less, but only if it is also 
well calibrated.  
 
The applicabǲǳǡ ǲǳǲǳ
how risk is described. Not all descriptions of risk involve quantification 
(Kristensen, Aven, & Ford, 2006), and not all quantified risk includes separate 
assessment of certainty.  
 
Not everyone agrees that risk estimate validity can be discussed in terms of 
accuracy, certainty and calibration at all.  For those who believe that risk is 
primarily constructive, risk assessments and analyses are cultural artefacts. They 
document rather than determine decisions about risk. Validation comes from 
ǲǳ(Goerlandt, 
khakzad, & Reniers, 2016). 
 
In this paper,  following the ǲǳapproach of Rae (2012) and 
Goerlandt (2016), we will evaluate claims about expertise in terms of the 
ontology used by the people who are making those claims.  If risk assessments 
and risk analyses are being used for the sole purpose of explaining how decisions 
have been reached Ȃ that is, their makers are not intending to make objective 
statements about risk Ȃ ǲǳǤ
analyses should be validated based on a constructivist understanding. However, 
when risk estimates are attempts to describe risk as a real objective 
phenomenon - as they are whenever risk estimates are an input into decision 
making about further risk treatment Ȃ the risk estimates must provide a good 
description of the thing they purport to measure (Rae et al., 2012).  
 
The combination of realist ontology and the use of experts requires a link 
between the two definitions of expertise. Experts should be a group of people 
whose opinions are deserving of extra weight because those opinions can be 
expected to be some combination of more accurate, more confident, and better 
calibrated.  
 
Does such a group exist?  
 
There are several plausible ways in which a potential expert could have a 
systematic advantage in making forecasts.  
 
The first mechanism Ȃ private information Ȃ is that they could have access to 
privileged information held only by experts (Morgan, 2014). In economics, it is 
commonly assumed that given the same information, two people will produce 
similar forecasts, with small variations due to error and uncertainty. What ǲǳǲǳivate information. 
Private information does not need to be explicit. It is possible that an expert 
cannot fully articulate exactly what it is ǲǳǤ
However, they can use this information intuitively to make better predictions.  
 
The second mechanism Ȃ domain knowledge Ȃ works through deep 
understanding of the specific causal mechanisms that lead to future outcomes in 
each particular case. What appears random and unpredictable to a layperson 
may be obvious to a scientist or engineer who understands the natural laws or 
technological principles governing the outcome (Farrington-Darby & Wilson, 
2006). This type of expertise is more about the ability to process information 
than the information itself Ȃ ǯ
strengths of various materials, but also how to calculate the integrity of a 
structure incorporating those materials.  
 
The third mechanism Ȃ super forecasting Ȃ is that experts may have superior 
general ability to extrapolate from the past to the future. This may be through 
pattern-matching skill Ȃ either instinctive projection of trends in the in the same 
way that an elite sports player can judge the future position of a ball, or by 
mastery of statistical tools for the identification of trends. Unlike the first and 
second mechanisms, the experts have no private information or domain 
knowledge, but they are more successful than others at reaching statistical 
conclusions. They are experts in the generic act of forecasting (Armstrong et al., 
2015).  
 
The three mechanisms are not entirely disjoint, but they indicate that there is a 
spectrum of forecasting expertise specificity. Super forecasting is quite generic 
and may be applied to a wide range of problems. Forecasting expertise based on 
knowledge of causal mechanisms is domain specific, but may be applied to most 
problems within that domain. Forecasting expertise based on private 
information is limited to those problems where the data is relevant.  
 
Some problems are more or less tractable for each mechanism. Super forecasting 
and private information are useful where historical data provides a trustworthy 
(but obscure) indication of the future. Domain expertise is useful for novel 
situations where historical data does not apply, but where causal models have 
some predictive power.  
 
All forms of expertise are at their weakest where there is little relevant historical 
data, and where the causal mechanisms are not well understood. In such cases, 
are some people still better forecasters than others? If so, under what conditions 
are they able to make more accurate predictions?  
2.2 Expert accuracy is difficult to study 
 
The ǲǳ
of uncertainty (Aspinall, 2010) provides a useful illustration of the theoretical 
and empirical difficulties in researching expert estimates. The Classical Method 
involves asking several experts ǲǳǡǤ	ǡǲǫǳǲ
and highest value such that the true cost will fall between those values 95% of ǫǳ 
 
Prior to the substantive estimation task, the experts are asked to participate in ǲǳǤ
Performance on these tasks is used to differentially weight the experts in the 
substantive estimation, such that greater weight is given to experts who perform 
better against the seed variable tasks.  
 
Each step in the Classical Method is well defined, and there is considerable real 
world experience with the method. Yet, it is a matter of considerable controversy 
how well the method works (Bolger & Rowe, 2015; Roger M. Cooke, 2015).    
 
The fundamental disagreement is about the relationship between the seed 
variable tasks and the substantive estimation tasks. Bolger and Rowe argue that 
since the seed variables represent known values, performance on these tasks is 
largely determined by skill at describing probabilities. Someone with low 
domain knowledge but good calibration may outperform a domain expert who is 
more accurate, but also overconfident or under confident. There is no reason 
(according to Bolger and Rowe) to believe that this superior performance 
translates to the substantive estimation task.  
 
Cooke responds by suggesting that the purpose of weighting is not to 
differentiate experts based on accuracy, but on their calibration. There is (no 
reason (according to Cooke) to believe that superior calibration demonstrated 
on the seed variable tasks does not translate to superior calibration on the 
substantive estimation tasks.  
 
The continuation of this debate 25 years after the Classical Method was first 
presented shows how difficult it is to provide fully persuasive arguments or 
empirical evidence about expert risk estimation performance.  
 
To start with, there are many experimenter degrees of freedom in designing the 
experiment: 
 
Whǲǳǫ Performing an experiment requires a sizeable 
body of experts. Actuaries, finance analysts, safety advisors and nuclear 
physicists represent very different types of expertise. Studies that show an 
advantage for one group of experts do not necessarily generalise to other 
experts.  
 
Who serves as the control group? It has been well established that cultural 
factors (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990) and demographics (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, 
Slovic, & Mertz, 2007) influence risk perception. Unless the expert group and 
control group are demographically matched, it is hard to say whether any 
observed effect is the result of expertise, rather than of culture and 
demographics.  
 
What task are the subjects given to perform? ǲǳ
the extent to which an experimental task matches a real world task. For some 
experiments, this has been interpreted as needing experts to perform a risk 
estimation task with which they are familiar. However, such designs actually 
reduce the generalizability of the experiment to other settings. If experts 
perform better merely because they have more practice at one specific task, this 
says little about their generalised ability to estimate risk.  
 How is performance evaluated? 
There are different ways groups of estimates can be compared. On average (i.e. 
the mean) are their predictions higher or lower than another group? Is the 
average member of the group (i.e. the median) higher or lower? Is their average 
error higher or lower? Are their results more spread out, or tightly clustered? 
Where do most of the answers in the group (i.e. the confidence interval) fall? 
 
How are differences interpreted? 
Even when experts make different predictions to lay people, this is not 
necessarily representative of improved performance. In some cases, there is no 
correct answer to compare estimates with. Even when there is such an answer, ǲǳnswer has been chosen by researchers, who are ǲǳ
the expert subjects. What appears to be objectively better performance may be 
stronger alignment of values and assumptions between the experts and the 
researchers.  
 
All of these issues make it difficult to draw conclusions about risk forecasting. 
They also provide numerous avenues for challenging empirical results.  
 
For example, one of the earliest sets of studies on risk perception was conducted 
by Slovic (1985). These studies held that expert judgements of risk are based on 
likelihood and consequence, whereas lay judgements are distorted by qualitative 
factors. This view has been highly influential in subsequent risk research 
(Sjöberg, 2002). 
 
Critics of the Slovic studies have since pointed out problems with each of the 
experimenter degrees of freedom (Rowe & Wright, 2001; Sjöberg, 2002): the ǲǡǡǡ
lawyer, a biologist, a biochemist, and a government regulator of hazardous 
materialsǳ (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979); the differences between the 
experts and the other groups are explainable in terms of their demographics; the 
task was ambiguous; most of the variance occurred in a small number of items; ǲǳǤ 
 
Whilst it is easy, with hindsight, to point out the problems with any particular 
study, it is also hard to design a study that escapes such criticism.  
 
Rowe and Wright (Rowe & Wright, 2001) review eight other empirical studies 
comparing experts with lay risk assessors, and point out consistent problems 
with the selection of the expert group, the design of the task, and the 
demographic matching of the expert and non-expert groups. Without such 
matching, they emphasise, any observed difference between lay and expert 
groups is explainable by factors such as age, gender and education.  
 
Rowe and Wright also note that none of the studies provides an indication of the 
accuracy of the risk estimates (as opposed to just indicating that the lay and 
expert groups made different estimates). In absence of direct evidence about 
accuracy, the apparent lack of reliability (i.e. agreement between the experts) 
provides a strong suggestion that the experts were not accurate. Reliability is a 
prerequisite for accuracy (Rae et al., 2012). 
2.3 Experts do not have access to privileged information about safety risk 
Fischhoff (1982) suggests that any advantage experts have in risk estimation ǡǲǡ
their disposǳǤ
expertise, they may in fact operate at a disadvantage by relying on particular 
types or sources of data that are no longer core to the problem at hand.  
 
All real-world risk estimates that rely on expert judgement operate outside the 
available data. Experts have a systematic advantage in experimental settings, 
which almost always involve risk problems for which there is a known answer.  
For example, Wright (2002) found that insurance underwriters were marginally 
better at some risk judgements than lay subjects. The experiment was 
specifically designed to match the types of judgements that the underwriters 
made in the course of their employment, and asked about population mortality 
risk, a topic where the underwriters were regularly exposed to the data they Ǥǲǳ
performed slightly better than the lay subjects.  
 
This improved performance evaporates when experts are asked to provide 
estimates in situations where the answer is unknown until after the estimate is 
made (Goodwin & Wright, 2010). There are two mechanisms undermining the 
experts. Firstly, they simply do not have enough examples of previous events Ȃ a ǲǳȂ to make accurate judgments. To the extent that they try to use 
their privileged knowledge about past events, they will be misled because the 
reference class does not adequately represent the circumstances they are 
hypothesising about. In fact, whilst their estimates are no better than lay 
predictions, experts may be overconfident in these estimates due to thinking that 
they do have useful privileged information (Lin & Bier, 2008). When asked to 
provide a range of estimates in this fashion, experts are more confident than lay 
estimators Ȃ they give narrower ranges Ȃ even though they are not more 
accurate.  
  
Experts are also undermined by a lack of feedback. The development of expertise 
requires practice at a learnable task. A learnable task is one with a strong 
performance-feedback loop. Where there is no such loop Ȃ where risk estimators 
do not receive clear feedback on the accuracy of their predictions Ȃ experience 
does not build expertise (Rowe & Wright, 2001). 
 
We do not mean to imply that historical data is an alternative to expertise, or 
that access to data makes someone an expert. Thomas (2004) points out that the 
target failure rates specified in standards for safety critical systems are in fact 
too low to ever be demonstrated. This is true even for the lowest levels of 
criticality (SIL 1 in IEC 61508). For these systems, the actual risk will never be 
known, and so the risk estimators will never have feedback on their 
performance. Expert judgement about risk under these circumstances is in 
practice endorsement of the design and the processes used to ensure that the 
design is safe, rather than an estimation of the residual risk per se, even if the 
judgements are expressed in the form of probabilistic estimates.  
2.4 Domain experts may have superior understanding of causal 
mechanisms 	ǡǡǲǡǮǯǯǨǳ(Feynman, 2001, p. 183). In context, Feynman was drawing a ǲǳȂ which he considered to be 
trustworthy and objectiveȂ ǲǳȂ which he considered 
to be arbitrary and subjective.  
 
Is this distinction real? Quantitative Risk Assessment has a controversial status 
as a form of analysis (Aven & Heide, 2009; Rae, Alexander, & McDermid, 2014), 
but there are many other forms of technical analysis that produce accurate 
quantitative outputs. Examples of such analysis include: 
x Short-term weather forecasting 
x Fire and explosion modelling 
x Static and dynamic analysis of loaded structures 
x Pedestrian and traffic modelling 
x Climate change modelling 
 
The common feature of these types of analysis is that they involve the 
application of scientific and engineering principles to extrapolate the future state 
of a system from its current state. There is still some uncertainty in this process, 
since it is still necessary to create or select an appropriate model, and to choose 
suitable parameters for the influences on the system; however experts may be 
presumed to have an advantage in performing both of these tasks (Notarianni & 
Fischbeck, 1999).  
 
This presumed advantage is disputed by Armstrong (1985), who suggests that a 
small amount of domain knowledge provides a benefit for understanding a 
forecasting problem, but that beyond this point further domain expertise does 
not translate into increased forecasting accuracy.  
 
The advantage that experts hold is strongest when the model incorporates a 
small number of physical laws from a single domain, and weakest when it is 
unclear what is or is not within scope of the model (Rae et al., 2014). Predicting 
the effect that a specific rate of CO2 emissions will have on the global 
temperature is a very different task from predicting how the international 
community will respond to climate change.  
2.5 Expertise does not confer immunity from bias  ? but the ability to 
reduce bias may be a form of expertise  
Accuracy in risk estimation can be achieved by reducing either random or 
systematic error. The previous section suggests that experts do not have an 
advantage for risk forecasting by reducing random error using information. 
However, it has also been suggested that experts might have superior skill at 
reducing systematic error (Slovic et al., 1979). 
 
Unfortunately, it appears that domain experts exhibit the same types of bias as 
lay people, especially when forced to go beyond the limits of their expertise 
(Fischhoff et al., 1982; Lin & Bier, 2008; Skjong, Wentworth, & others, 2001). 
Moreover, there is some evidence that experts may be more prone than non-
experts to particular types of bias. For example, experts may tend to structure 
problems to include existing numerical data and exclude difficult-to-quantify 
factors (Fischhoff et al., 1982; Slovic et al., 1985). They may also experience 
overconfidence (Lin & Bier, 2008) and anchoring based on early information or 
previously expressed opinions (Kinney & Uecker, 1982).  
 
There is, however, some evidence of forecasters who are more expert precisely 
because they are less prone to reasoning errors. Mellers et al. report on a large ǲǳ 
(Mellers et al., 2015). The experiment made use of a forecasting competition to 
identify individuals who were skilled at real-world predictions. The longitudinal 
nature of the competition allowed for forecasting tasks where the correct answer 
was unknown before the study, but was known afterwards (unlike laboratory ǲǳȌǤ
The study presents four hypotheses for the success of the successful individuals: 
 
1. General cognitive abilities and styles such as fluid intelligence, 
enjoyment of problem solving, and willingness to change their minds 
2. Task specific skills, such as the ability to make consistent probabilistic 
judgements (particularly with respect to conditional probabilities) 
3. Motivation and commitment  
4. More frequent and nuanced interaction with other forecasters 
 
All four possibilities are plausible based on correlations between the 
hypothesised success factor and performance in the experiment. However, the 
project focussed on prediction of newsworthy events, with a particular emphasis 
on politics. It is not possible at this stage to exclude the possibility that the 
superforecasters achieved their superior results simply through superior general 
knowledge of current affairs and politics, rather than from truly generic non-
domain forecasting expertise.  
3 Can expert judgements of risk be made more accurate? 
3.1 The way questions are asked influences the validity of expert forecasts 
Mosleh (1988) ǲǳǲǳ for expert judgements. Substantive goodness refers to an ǯs subject matter knowledge, whilst normative goodness refers to the ǯ ability to express that knowledge in probabilistic form. The way in 
which a problem is put to the expert can significantly change the normative 
goodness. Different ways to ask the same question can encourage or discourage 
cognitive bias. They can also create a mismatch between how the expert 
understands the question, and how the information is going to be used.  
 
Framing bias (Skjong et al., 2001) is where experts are unconsciously steered 
towards a particular answer by the way they are presented with information. For 
example, a problem may be presented in a way that has lots of detail about 
operator error and limited detail on mechanical failure, or vice versa. An 
unbiased analyst should, in principle, treat the shortage of information in one 
area as increased uncertainty. In fact, experts are more likely to present an 
answer dominated by the more detailed topic. They are more sensitive to 
information that is presented in great detail. The effects of framing bias can be 
reduced by allowing experts to seek out relevant information for themselves, 
rather than by providing them with lots of detail in the problem presentation.  
 
Anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) is where individuals form a starting ȋǲǳȌ
further information. The starting estimate may come from a recent similar task, 
the first stage of a mental computation, or information provided in the question.  
For example, consider an expert asked to estimate the hourly frequency of death 
for driving a car, and then asked to estimate the hourly frequency of death for 
riding a motorbike. They are likely to select two values that are closer to each 
other than the actual historical figures are. Anchoring effects can be reduced by ǲǳ
a judgement of uncertainty (Morgan, 2014) 
 
Equivocation involves multiple meanings for the same term. Walsten (1986) 
and Wardekker (2008) point out the considerable difficulties with semi-
quantitative elicitation of risk judgements. Individual interpretation of ǲǳǡǲǳǡǲǳǡ
same qualitative term are in fact referring to the same underlying quantified 
range of likelihoods.  
 
Framing bias, anchoring, and equivocation are not the only forms of bias in risk 
estimation. They are representative examples that demonstrate why the design 
of appropriate questions, based on up-to-date understanding of cognitive science 
literature, is important for expert forecast of probabilities.  
3.2 Training experts influences the validity of their forecasts 
Research on expert elicitation that suggests that particular modes of thinking 
result in better estimates (Mellers et al., 2015). However, elicitation research is 
itself mostly only validated for non-forecast probabilistic judgements. Applying 
this research to the question of forecast validity must assume that there is some 
degree of substantive goodness in the expert judgements, such that 
improvements in normative goodness improve the overall goodness. It is also 
necessary to assume that improving expert performance on non-forecast 
estimation tasks carries over on to forecast estimation tasks.  
 
For example, systematic under or overestimation can be improved by asking 
experts to perform sample tasks, and then providing feedback on their 
performance (Morgan, 2014). This type of training also decreases expert 
confidence Ȃ necessary, since experts are typically overconfident.   
 
There is also some evidence to suggest that asking estimators to make multiple 
judgements, either at different times or using different assumptions, can improve 
accuracy (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009; Vul & Pashler, 2008). 
3.3 Task decomposition influences the validity of expert forecasts 
There is mixed evidence on whether decomposing a risk forecast problem into 
smaller problems helps or hinders forecast accuracy (Chhibber, Apostolakis, & 
Okrent, 1992). On the one hand, decomposition of a problem into smaller 
problems improves transparency, and allows the use of multiple specialists with 
different areas of expertise. It also allows for the possibility that asking for many 
smaller estimates allows errors in those estimates to cancel each other out.  
 
On the other hand, decomposing increases the complexity of the forecasting 
problem. It introduces further source of errors: the decomposition model itself 
can be wrong, or the experts may misunderstand which part of the problem they 
are being asked about. Rosqvist (2010) explains that transfer of parameter 
information from a domain expert to a risk analyst requires shared 
understanding of the mental model. However, mental models can only be 
represented by artefacts rather than directly compared, and are not stable over 
time.  
 
Estimation decomposition may be considered analogous to decision-support 
tools that ask users a series of simple questions that are algorithmically 
combined to provide a final answer (Burns & Pearl, 1981). Such systems assume ǲǳǡǲǳǤ	
problems, decomposition makes sense if the experts have privileged information, 
but not if they are being relied on for their domain expertise. Domain expertise 
relies on knowledge of the structure of the problem Ȃ asking a domain expert for 
information in a way that presumes that the questioner knows more about the 
problem structure than the expert defeats the purpose of expert elicitation.  
4 Are multiple experts better than one expert? 
4.1 Opinions can be combined socially or mathematically ǡǲǳ
(Surowiecki, 2005) or does the suppression of dissent lead groups astray 
(Solomon, 2006)? Unsurprisingly, tǲǳǤ	ǡǲǳ(Ferguson, 2009).    
 
A more useful task is to unpick when, how and why combinations of judgements 
are better than a single judgement for the purpose of risk forecasting. This task 
can be undertaken in several ways. All three approaches have the same inputs: a 
set of individuals with starting opinions, and a process by which the starting 
opinions are combined. The approaches differ in how they characterise the 
process.  
 
The first approach, used in social psychology, sees decision making as a form of 
social behaviour. The research objective is to examine by observation how 
groups interact to achieve consensus (Kerr & Tindale, 2011). Methodological 
approaches range from controlled experiments to textual analysis of real-world 
meetings.  
 
The second approach, common in economics, is to treat group decision making 
as an information-sharing problem. The researchers model the individual 
starting opinions, and run simulations to evaluate different algorithms for 
combination (Clemen, 1989). Each expert is modelled as an assemblage of 
private information, public information, and noise. On each simulation run their ǲǳusing a random value for the noise, and the algorithm is 
used to establish consensus.  
 
The third approach is to conduct large scale forecasting competitions, and to 
examine the individual strategies and group dynamics that lead to success 
(Makridakis & Hibon, 2000). This approach is initially agnostic as to the nature of 
the processes, but seeks to understand how good forecasters and forecasting 
groups describe their own processes.  
 
These research methodologies align with the practical methods by which 
judgements can be combined (R. M. Cooke & Goossens, 2004). Mechanical 
combination asks experts to make individual estimates, which are used as inputs 
to an algorithm to produce a final answer. Mechanical combination involves no 
social interaction, and so relies on information-sharing via the estimates 
themselves. As an alternative, behavioural combination allows interaction 
between experts to produce a judgement. Behavioural combination allows for 
experts to share information and attempt to persuade each other before reaching 
a consensus.  Whether persuasion is a good or a bad thing depends on whether 
being right makes someone more persuasive. We will address this question in 
Section 4.2.  
 
Some approaches use both mechanisms in sequential combination, with 
individual forecasts followed by group discussion, group discussion followed by 
individual forecasts, or multiple rounds of forecast and discussion.  
4.2 Allowing experts to interact is possibly a good idea 
For group-based decision making to improve forecast accuracy, it is necessary 
that some members will, after interacting with the rest of the group, update their 
original forecast in the right direction (Wright & Rowe, 2011).  
 ǡǲǳǲǳ
problems, where the right answer is obvious once it is known (Laughlin & Ellis, 
1986). In a good riddle or cryptic crossword clue there is only one answer that ǲǳȂ a group member who finds this answer can easily persuade the other 
members. 
 
For other problems (for example knowing the age of a celebrity) a person with 
the wrong answer is just as likely to be persuasive as someone with the right 
answer.   
 
Risk estimation is not a Eureka problem. However, there is a possibility that 
discussion between experts will identify errors in reasoning, and will enhance 
the information available to each expert (Mellers et al., 2015; Wright & Rowe, 
2011) 
 
The counterargument is that groups are predisposed to work towards 
consensus, rather than making small adjustments to the individual positions 
(Solomon, 2006). This phenomenon Ȃ groupthink Ȃ can result in the group 
selecting the most confident or authoritative opinion.  Relying on the most 
confident opinion is not necessarily a bad thing, and works well for problems 
where most people know the correct answer (Koriat, 2012). However, for ǡǯ
more likely to be accurate. It is not possible to know in advance whether the 
most confident or least confident person is more likely to be right.  
 
Kerr and Tindale (2011) suggest that in purely judgemental tasks (where there 
is no correct answer) groups tend to coalesce around the majority opinion. 
However, when the correctness of an answer can be justified, this increases the 
chance of a minority opinion prevailing. Unfortunately, it is often possible for an 
incorrect answer to be justified. Probability calculations are frequently counter-
intuitive, and groups may adopt ǲǳǤ 
This phenomenon is illustrated by the history of the Monty Hall problem, where 
incorrect solutions are frequently more persuasive than correct solutions 
(Krauss & T, 2003). 
 
Strategies for group forecasting should take into account the success and failure 
mechanisms of groups. In particular, group forecasting methods should (Wright 
& Rowe, 2011): 
x Include an opportunity for group members to establish trust in each other 
as sources of information 
x Focus on sharing information, rather than just the individual estimates 
x Ensure minority viewpoints are expressed 
x Provide individuals an opportunity to reflect on new evidence, and to 
revise their original position 
 
4.3 Mathematically combining opinions provides a better understanding of 
both risk and uncertainty 
 
If experts are prohibited from social interaction during the forecasting process, 
then the efficacy of multiple experts is a mathematical problem with a clear 
answer. In almost all forecasting situations, combining expert opinions is more 
accurate than selecting an individual opinion.  
 
Combining individual results to produce a more accurate aggregate result has a 
long history (Graefe, Armstrong, Jones, & Cuzan, 2013). As early as 1818, Laplace 
noted that combining results of experiments reduced the effects of random 
noise. Zajunc (1962) describes the history of statistical aggregation of group 
estimates in psychology. The original now-famous article by Galton (1907) 
observed that the median answer in competition to guess the weight of an ox at a 
county show was also the most accurate answer. Subsequent work replicated 
this result with other estimation problems, and additionally found that often the 
mean answer was more accurate than any individual guess.  
 
The main mathematical property at work is now understood as the bracketing 
effect (Larrick & Soll, 2006).  Bracketing works regardless of the sources of 
individual error, which may arise from: 
x Different information held by different individuals 
x Different assumptions and models used to create estimates 
x Random variation (noise) in individual estimates.  
 
Imagine two or more forecasts, each with some amount of error, such that the 
true value is bracketed Ȃ it lies somewhere within the range of forecasts.  Then 
create an average of all the forecasts. Mathematically, the error for the average 
forecast will never be greater than the average expected value of picking a 
forecast at random. Also, the worst case for picking a forecast at random will 
always have a larger error than the average forecast.  
 
In other words, where there is a pool of experts with equal skill, it is never better 
mathematically, and may be considerably worse, to pick an individual than to 
poll the pool.  
 ǯǫ
pool, such that all of the experts are on one side of the correct value, then the 
average forecast will perform exactly the same as the expected value of choosing 
a forecast at random (Larrick & Soll, 2006). Under these circumstances there is 
decided benefit to finding and using the best individual, but there is no way of 
knowing if, and in which direction, the pool is biased. Trying to anticipate and 
compensate for all of the experts being biased is a recipe for dramatically 
increasing rather than decreasing error.  
 
The theoretical advantage of bracketing has been verified in practice through 
many experiments. Clemen (1989) performed a review of the experimental 
literature. In those experiments, combining always improved forecasts and often 
outperformed the best individual forecast.  
 
Once the bracketing effect is understood, the remaining question is whether a 
better forecast can be created by selecting a smaller, more accurate pool of 
forecasters Ȃ possibly even by choosing the best forecaster.  
 
Goldstein (2014) examined ǲǡǳ groupings within a 
larger pool, by analysing the results of online fantasy soccer competitions. The 
experiment showed that increasing group size improved performance up to a 
certain point, after which further increase resulted in less accurate predictions. 
In other words, adding experts can improve the consensus even when it is 
predicted that their individual performance is worse than all of the current 
group members. Group performance comes from the aggregate knowledge, 
rather the average individual performance. However, additional experts bring 
noise as well as information. The tipping point occurs when adding an additional 
expert would contribute more noise than information. 
 
This is why election poll combining systems such as fivethirtyeight.com are able 
to make credible claims (backed up by a track record of successful predictions) 
that their model outperforms simply picking the individual polls with the best 
track record. It also explains why they incorporate (albeit with lower weighting) 
polls known to be historically less accurate (Graefe et al., 2013).  
 
Combinations of experts are an improvement over individuals not just for the 
direct forecast task, but also for understanding how reliable the forecast is. 
Knowing the degree of consensus between independent experts places a 
minimum bound on the amount of uncertainty contained in the estimate. Where 
experts strongly disagree, non-experts should not be confident even in an 
aggregate forecast.  
 
4.4 There is no extra validity in complicated ways to combine opinions 
 
In 1969, Bates and Granger experimented with various ways of combining 
forecasts about airline passenger data made by different models. In order to 
design their experiments, they considered (Bates & Granger, 1969): 
 
1. How should past performance of forecasters be taken into account in 
combination?  
2. How should individual forecasts be transformed before they are 
combined? 
3. Should the combination take into account internal details of the individual 
forecasting models? 
4. After any transformation, how exactly should the forecasts be combined?  
 
In the following decades, hundreds of papers provided different answers to these 
questions, seeking the ideal mathematical mechanism for combining a pool of 
forecasts into a single forecast.  
 
The simplest answer to the questions is to calculate a linear average, giving each 
forecast an equal weight. After a thorough review of twenty years of evidence, 
Clemen (1989) concluded that this is often the best method of combining.  
 
However, ǯ the 
forecasting community (Wallis, 2011) there are a number of theoretical 
arguments why simple averaging with equal linear weights is not expected to 
produce an optimal answer. The first and most obvious argument is that equal 
weighting contradicts the starting assumption that some people are more expert 
than others. If all experts are presumed equal, this is inconsistent with the claim 
that experts are superior to non-experts.  
 
A second argument is that aggregate forecasts have different mathematical 
properties to single forecasts. For example, Baron et al. (2014) showed that 
aggregated probabilities correspond closer to the real world if they are 
transformed so that they are closer to 0% or 100%. There are both mathematical 
and psychological reasons for this. Mathematically, it is not possible to have a 
probability smaller than 0% or greater than 100%. Thus, as an individual 
estimate approaches 0% or 100%, noise is more likely to take it towards than 
away from 50%. Psychologically, experts tend to allow for their own ignorance in 
making estimates, biasing distribution away from extremes. Rather than 
cancelling out, as in the case of normally distributed noise, these skews are 
compounded by forecast aggregation.  
 
The third argument is that individual experts may hold information that is 
destroyed by simple aggregation. Why not ask experts not just for a final answer, 
but also for their intermediate calculations? Combining expert opinions for each 
part of the problem, rather than for the whole, might allow better integration of 
the full information held by each expert (Kaplan, 1992).  
 
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that any approach based on this third 
argument provides improved forecast accuracy. Zhang and Tai (2016) provide a 
review of one such method, Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN). In the field of 
maritime accidents alone Zhang and Tai identified over thirty published papers 
presenting methods for risk estimation using BBN with expert opinions. Most of 
these papers suggest that BBN provides superior objectivity and reduces bias. 
None provide evidence of increased accuracy.  
 
There is a similar body of work, with similar lack of evidence, covering the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). See for example Wang (2016) claiming ǲǳ
increased accuracy. In fact, there are strong arguments that AHP may in fact 
introduce mathematical anomalies through impermissible mathematical 
operations, contradictory axioms, and misunderstood scales (Warren, 2004).  
 ǡǡǡǲǳ variants of all 
four techniques, are mechanisms for aggregating expert opinions to provide risk 
forecasts. It is beyond the scope of this paper to comment more generally on the 
usefulness of these techniques for other purposes. For risk forecasting, there is 
an increasing volume of academic work refining, expanding, and combining the 
techniques, without any corresponding increase in the body of evidence 
suggesting that they can produce superior forecasts.  
 
Ball (2002) suggests that the proliferation of complicated risk estimation 
techniques is a response by the risk estimation community to broader social 
disputes about risk. Risk estimators are typically mathematicians and engineers - ǲthose who enjoy quiet, meticulous workǳ- poorly equipped by training and 
inclination to engage in social and epistemological debate. Instead of responding 
to broad challenges to risk estimation validity, they concentrate on refining the 
technical detail of risk estimation methods.  
5 The path to improving expert judgement validity is 
through more description and less quantification 
 
All practitioners of risk assessment adopt ontologies of risk. These ontologies are 
usually implicit, and adopted without deep consideration, or even any awareness 
that other ontologies are possible. Risk researchers, on the other hand, are often 
greatly interested in exactly what risk is, and in subtle distinctions between risk 
and related concepts such as probability, certainty, and strength of evidence.  
The result is that critic and practitioner disagreements are often about the 
nature of validity rather than validity itself.  
 
Experts are current asked to estimate risks in contexts that assume: 
 
1. That actual risk is real and objective 
2. That individual estimates of risk have varying performance based on 
accuracy, certainty and calibration with respect to the actual risk 
3. That expert estimates of risk have superior performance 
4. That sophisticated elicitation and combination techniques improve expert 
performance 
 
For the purpose of our review, we granted the first two of these assumptions. 
This is the principle of pragmatic validity - that risk assessments should be 
judged based on how they are performed and used, rather than on external 
ontologies of risk.  
 
After making this concession, we then examined the best available evidence for 
the remaining two assumptions. We considered evidence about expert 
forecasting more generally, and risk estimation specifically. Neither assumption 
can be supported.  
 
It is a mistake to believe that expert status acquired through authority, 
experience or job description, carries with it an ability to make risk forecasts 
that are somehow more objectively accurate. Whilst it is plausible that some 
individuals have superior skill at risk forecasting, there is no method other than 
past performance to identify such people. And in the case of low frequency high 
consequence events, there is insufficient past data to make those judgements.  
 
It is also dangerous to suggest that convoluted methods of expert estimate 
elicitation or complicated mechanisms for estimate combination enhance the 
validity of expert judgements. Combining multiple forecasts will almost always 
result in a better forecast, but this improvement is realised by simple averaging 
of the individual judgements. Providing experts with an opportunity to interact 
may increase forecast accuracy, but improvement through this method is not 
guaranteed. Decomposing forecast problems and asking experts to tackle each 
component in turn has plausible benefits, but also plausible drawbacks.  
 
Against this lack of evidence must be weighted the unquestionable costs of using 
experts.  There is substantial time and money involved in selecting groups of 
experts and providing them opportunity to interact or participate in multi-stage 
elicitation processes. Worse, there is an increase in apparent validity without a 
corresponding increase in actual validity. Methods that increase cost and 
apparent validity should be justified by commensurate increases in actual 
validity. 
 
One thing that is known for sure is that experts tend to be overconfident in the 
accuracy of their forecasts. Complicated elicitation and combination methods 
make this worse. Their apparent sophistication increases the appearance of 
validity without improving actual accuracy. Complexity is bad for transparency. 
It disguises the effects of modelling assumptions and parameter selection. It 
risks applying expert opinions in ways that contradict the understanding of 
those very same experts. It disguises the fundamental weakness of expert risk 
estimation Ȃ that domain experts are being asked questions beyond the limits of 
their expertise Ȃ behind a cloak of algorithmic magic.  
 
Activities that increase the appearance of assurance at the same time as they are 
unable to provide useful assessment are examples of probative blindness (Rae & 
Alexander, 2017). Probative blindness contributes to the inability of 
organisations to appropriately update beliefs about danger, a central theme in ǲǳ(Dekker, 2011) and disaster incubation 
(Turner, 1976). 
 
What does this mean for conscientious analysts, researchers and decision 
makers, who want to make use of the best available evidence, but do not wish to 
overstate the quality and validity of that evidence?  
 
We should all pay attention to experts. When domain experts agree about causal 
mechanisms, that consensus should form an important element of prediction and 
planning. Where experts disagree, the contradictions provide important 
information about structural uncertainty, and tell us to be less confident in the 
predictions we make.  
 
However, it is clear that expert estimates are currently being elicited and applied Ȃ including by researchers Ȃ in ways that are not supported by the evidence 
about what experts are capable of. Expert risk assessments are not fit for 
purpose when used as truth-engines to measure risk as an objective quantity, so 
they should not be used for that purpose. 
 
Any solution requires more transparency surrounding the risk assessment 
process, including clear explanations of the underlying methodological Ǥǲǳǡ
believed to have superior performance at this task?  
 
We, the authors, are agnostic about how this is to be achieved, but we recognise 
two promising directions.  
 
The first possibility is to focus on risk assessment as a means of describing, 
rather than quantifying risk. See for example the work of Kristensen (2006), 
Flage (2009) and Aven (2013). Each of these papers suggests replacing 
probability as the core dimension of risk with a more nuanced explanation of 
uncertainty. This is in contrast to current practice, where, when uncertainty is 
described at all, it is a qualifier or modifier for risk expressed as a probability 
(Eduljee, 2000).  
 
There are open questions about the best way to communicate information about 
strength of evidence (Shackley & Wynne, 1996) and whether experts are in fact 
capable of distinguishing between their estimates and their uncertainties (Bolger 
& Rowe, 2015). 
 
The second possibility is to encourage practitioner acceptance of the 
constructivist view - that expert judgements about risk are a tool for 
communicating rather than quantifying risk. They gain validity through 
transparency. This view is consistent with standards for risk assessment review 
based on form and content, but is inconsistent with regulations based on the 
achievement of specific risk targets.   
 
Ultimately, safety is improved through better physical and organisational 
conditions, including but not limited to specific hazard controls. This is best 
served by open discussions about the sources of risk, the current safety 
measures, and the quality of the evidence informing decisions about further 
improvements. Expert opinion has an important role to play in these discussions, 
but this role should not be confused by methods that provide a false assurance of 
objectivity.  
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